However the war in Ukraine plays out in the coming weeks, even a cursory examination of the region’s history illustrates that Moscow’s most recent violent attempt to transform its neighbor into a demilitarized vassal state is doomed. Putin’s violent march backward through time to try to cobble together the old Russian empire is already a strategic failure. He’s not learned that the adage You can never go home again, applies to all empires, including Russia. The future requires something new not an imitation of what failed in the past.
Putin cannot win. Ukraine has already won.
Although Ukraine traces its origins to Kyivan Rus as do the Muscovites, the Mongol invasion of the 13th century led to those linguistic and cultural distinctions that exist between Ukrainians, Russians, and Belorussians. In a way the Mongols really never left. Three hundred years passed before Moscow’s Machiavellian intrigues and military eliminated the Mongol yoke from its shoulders, but by the mid 1500s, Ukraine had also evolved and created one of the first democratic states in Europe since ancient Greece, the Cossack Hetmanate near Kyiv.
Long time mercenaries, This military and political conclave gained enough strength to rid itself of Polish control by the mid 1600s. Still, military adventurism being what it is, within a few years they needed assistance to fend off their neighbor to the west, Poland. The Hetmanate looked to Russia, and they responded. Their military assistance was solidified in Treaty of Pereyaslav as was Ukraine’s demise. The treaty granted that the Tsar was head of Russia, but also guaranteed independence for the Cossacks. Moscow ignored the clause about Cossack independence and has used this treaty ever since as a rationale for claiming Ukraine belongs to Moscow. The brief era of Cossack freedom and political/military independence ended soon thereafter. Ukraine substituted one master for another, but Ukrainians continued to aspire to political independence, even linking their future state to their Cossack origins as noted in Ukraine’s national anthem.
Ukraine’s efforts at independence continued soon thereafter. About fifty years after Ukraine’s “Great Ruin,” trusted and elderly court advisor to Peter the Great, the Cossack Ivan Mazeppa, tried to rid Ukraine of Moscow’s control by aligning the Cossack forces with those of Sweden’s King Charles XII with whom Russia was at war. Sadly for Ukraine, Charles lost, Cossack forces were decimated, and before the end of the century, no longer existed as a fighting force. Matters then became worse for Kyiv when by the mid 1800s, Russia even outlawed the use of Ukrainian throughout the empire. Generations of Ukrainians were ripe for intense Russian disinformation and terror.
What was the cost of Moscow’s draconian efforts? The result was the re-emergence of independent Ukraine following the end of WWI. A modern country facing three armies: that of the newly resurrected Poland; of the Russian communists; and of the Russians still loyal to the Tsar. Not a Soviet invention as Putin professed in his manifesto. The Ukrainian People’s Republic lasted about three years, although Kyiv changed hands militarily several times before finally succumbing to the USSR’s might and transforming into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1922. A political entity forced upon a weakened Russia because of the people who inhabited the land, not some Soviet invention.
Somehow, some way, Ukrainians survived as a viable political, military, and cultural group. Indeed, so far, each attempt to absorb Ukraine into Russia (or Poland) resulted in a more distinct political identity. That the Ukrainian SSR was subject to Russian edicts and remained politically sycophantic to Moscow, but Kyiv’s administration was responsible for overseeing the infrastructure of the nation. It was real not some imagined entity people snickered at. Not a hodgepodge of peoples of various ethnicity who congregated in the fertile area north of the Black Sea. It was simply another expression of Ukraine as a political reality. Regardless of what an old KGB officer thinks, Ukraine’s existence is a fait accompli whatever its genesis.
Ukraine next emerged in 1991 as fully fledged, ethnically intact nation. The march of history for Ukraine is that each reincarnation of its political identity has been something of an improvement upon the previous manifestation. Cossack mercenaries succeeded in creating a military, political state. Cossacks followed this by aligning themselves with Europe’s leading military power at the time to divorce themselves from Moscow. After sustaining brutal re-education, ethnic cleansing, and a ban on the use of their language, Ukraine responded by forming a true nation-state from the ashes of WWI, short lived though it was. Next Kyiv found itself as the capital of a republic that delivered the country’s needs for over seventy years.
Today, unlike previous generations when Ukrainians were as interested as anyone in the political movements of the moment, movements like anarchism, communism, socialism, pan slavism, fascism, and nationalism, there is no internal tension today caused by an interest in anything but national survival and continuing the trek toward liberal democracy. No one in Ukraine is interested in pan slavism, Russky Mir, or a USSR redux. Following Putin’s invasion, fifth columnists in Ukraine are in hiding, or having seen the true face of Russia, support Kyiv because Ukraine is large enough to absorb Russians and make them feel like Ukrainians. This was true during the SSR years and is more true today. I base this on limited information, but I should share nonetheless.
At university, I socialized with four exchange students I met from the USSR in the mid 1970s, with two standing out in my memory. The ethnic Ukrainian lived in Moscow and his Russification was complete. The ethnic Russian who lived in Ukraine spoke Ukrainian and understood my stand on Ukrainian independence.After an intense discussion, he declined my invitation to defect, and I sometimes imagine him working with Gorbachev’s efforts at glasnost and perestroika during the 1980s. I gleaned the same from statistics in The Ukrainian Quarterly describing language trends in Kyiv and other large cities in Ukraine during the 1980s. The article’s main point was that those who moved to Ukraine tended to learn Ukrainian and began little by little to lose their Russian identity.
This helps in part to explain why articles appearing in 2014 showed the ethnic Russians in the Donbas area were disinterested in any separation from Kyiv. One segment stood out to me and explained how a young ethnic Russian claimed he would fight against any Russian incursions there in defiance of his grandfather who did support Moscow. Putin believed the Russian minority in eastern Ukraine would arise and take up arms against Kyiv, but this did not happen. Instead, rabble rousers from the Russian Federation flooded the area and caused the military stalemate that lasted until February 2022. Russians in Ukraine become Ukrainian, and that’s bad news for Putin’s historical revision, and good news for Ukraine’s future.
However this war turns out, the end has been determined. Russia cannot hope to control this largest of nations wholly in Europe. Ukraine’s military and citizens have shown this already in 2022 as they have beaten back the invaders time and again. Ukraine is not relying on others to fight for her, but gratefully accepting help in the form of hardware from her democratic allies. Most importantly, Ukrainians of whatever ethnicity are united in a way they never have been previously. Ironically, Kyiv has Vladimir Putin’s ignorance of history to thank for that unity. In so many ways it appears that Ukraine cannot lose.
Indeed, Ukraine has already won.